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The objective of this paper is to re-examine the risk-and eﬀort attitude in the context of
strategic dynamic interactions stated as a discrete-time ﬁnite-horizon Nash game. The analysis
is based on the assumption that players are endogenously risk-and eﬀort-averse. Each player is
characterized by distinct risk-and eﬀort-aversion types that are unknown to his opponent. The
goal of the game is the optimal risk-and eﬀort-sharing between the players. It generally depends
on the individual strategies adopted and, implicitly, on the the players’ types or characteristics.
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1. Introduction
For reaching better results, very often in practice, the players are incited to cooperate.
A non-cooperative solution is not necessarily satisfying. In the absence of cooperation, it is
possible that the results are inferior to what could be achieved with coordinated behavior. An
additional act of cooperation always brings a positive contribution.
A cooperative decision making approach is useful when dealing with a strategic complexity
of the players. Although the players cooperate, they can remain independent. Moreover, a co-
operative behavior may emerge in non-cooperative situations when the nature of the interaction
is for a long term.
In the real world, there exist many situations when the players are engaged in a game
containing both cooperative and non-cooperative elements. For example, they can form coop-
erative coalitions which interact in a non-cooperative fashion. Moreover, the players can exhibit
variable degrees of cooperation. The form of the relationships between the players’ actions and
the resulting outputs may aﬀect the level of cooperation.
Suppose that two players with potentially conﬂicting interests share the same dynamic
environment. Its trajectory is inﬂuenced by their individual actions. Some pure conﬂicting
interests are generally rare and in most economic applications there are both, common and
conﬂicting interests present.
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with which decisions are undertaken are improved. Inappropriate decisions or uncorrelated
objectives can generate unexpected outputs, with undesirable consequences on the equilibrium
and stability of the game.
Nash equilibrium basically requires rational players and mutual beliefs about actions (Au-
mann and Brandenburger 1995). The rationality of the players is characterized by the
anticipation that the system will be aﬀected by other factors than their own control instruments.
These factors are either completely or partially observed and may be exogenous variables or un-
observed random shocks. Even if the players act in an individually rational way, their strategic
interactions can quite often cause collective irrationality.
Multiplayer models are generally complicated, requiring some speciﬁed form of interaction
or some premise as to the outcome of this interaction. In such of situations, the problem to
be solved is, on the one hand, the nature of equilibrium and its deﬁnition, and on the other
hand, the existence and uniqueness of equilibruim and its stability. All these aspects must be
considered in a world which changes.
It is possible that the system shifts from an equilibrium to another due to permanent
random shocks. The ﬁnal equilibrium will not be hence determined by the initial conditions
alone. There is a path dependency of equilibria, such that past equilibria impact the trajectory
of future equilibria.
The analysis is placed in the context of the closed-loop control theory, the information being
utilized by the players in real time. Closed-loop games are appropriate modelling approaches
to economic environmental problems, being often employed in empirical modelling and policy
analyses. The closed-loop decisions are speciﬁc to some short term interactions. In this case,
the players set their control vectors as functions of the system history. They thus attempt to
reduce the uncertainties related to the choice of their actions by acquiring new information in
the game.
The dynamic learning process is endogenous, that is, the players learn from observing and
base their actions on their state of knowledge at the point where the actions are taken. By
their learning process, the players aﬀect the strategic variables they are learning about. Their
decision rules are reviewed and revised in response to new signals from the system. The players
thus reﬁne the distance between the current target position and their ﬁxed objectives at each
stage of the game. The control inputs implemented by the players are purported to contribute
towards equilibrium and stability of the dynamic system.
The process of control has the implementation stage of an individual plan built into it. It
is in the players’ interest to move in their desired direction at each stage of the game.
Although there is a large amount of literatureo ng a m et h e o r y ,t h e r ei sl i t t l ew o r kf o c u s e d
on Nash-type equilibria incorporating time-varying endogenous risk inherent to the system.
Most of prior research has only considered the case of exogenous risk, that is, external to the
system, and hence beyond the control of the players. There is generally an intimate relationship
between endogenous risk and adaptive eﬀort behavior. In real world situations, the ﬂuctuating
level of the risk is an input in the eﬀort estimation process. The players’ eﬀort behavior is thus
endogenous by nature. This important aspect is almost ignored in the literature, resulting in a
biased analysis of equilibrium dynamics. When players are risk-and eﬀort-averse, it is optimal
for them to share risk and eﬀort.
The purpose of the present study is to re-evaluate the traditional approach, by taking into
account endogenous risk-and eﬀort-averse behavior in dynamic strategic interactions stated as
aN a s hg a m e .
2The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 deals with
the players’ risk behavior. Section 4 focuses on the players’ eﬀort behavior. Section 5 deﬁnes
the information structure of the game. Section 6 introduces the concept of optimal Nash
equilibrium strategy sensitive to endogenous risk and eﬀort and provides a complete analytical
characterization of the closed-loop solution path. Section 7 concludes and makes suggestions
for further research.
2. The Model
An environment consists of the speciﬁcation of three distinct objects. First, it is the set of
players. Second, the preferences of each player. And ﬁnally, the information structure, that is,
the set of parameters which can be observed by each player.
The players are characterized by an individual rationality, in the sense that they will not
refuse to act in accordance with the eﬃcient outcome. They are supposed to share the same
environment which generally have a diﬀerent impact on their individual behavior.
In the present study, we consider the case of a dynamic Nash game composed of two playing
periods, say [−T1,0] and [1,T 2]. We only analyze the second period [1,T 2]b yt a k i n gi n t o
account the information acquired by the players in the ﬁrst period [−T1,0]. The players are
indexed by an ordered pair (i,j) ∈ {(1,2),(2,1)}, where the index j refers to the opponent of
the player i.
Let us give the formal statement of the problem. The discrete time periods are denoted
by t =1 ,...,T2. The end of the planning horizon is generally dictated by the degree of uncer-
tainty in the external environment. Higher the uncertainty, shorter the planning horizon. The
variables involved in the problem are listed as follows:
Let x
(i)
t ∈ Rqi be the player i’s control instrument for the period t,a n dl e tyt ∈ Rp be
the observed target variable in t. There is generally a stochastic relationship between players’
actions and observations. Let zt ∈ Rr be an exogenous variable not subjected to the control
of the players at time t,a n dl e te
(i)
t be the player i’s eﬀort level in t.D e n o t e b y ut ∈ Rp
an exogenous environmental “white noise” modelled by a normal random variable with zero
mean-vector and ﬁnite variance-covariance matrix Ψ.
We make the following basic assumptions:
Assumption 1. The evolution of the system is modelled by a discrete-time multivariate
linear stochastic process:


























t ,B t,D t) ∈ Rk is the time-varying parameter to be
estimated. This speciﬁes the structure of the model according to the information available in
t.
Assumption 2.T h eﬁrst step in the decision making process is to establish a set of non-
conﬂicting objectives. The exploitation of the environment is generally asymmetric and the
players have diﬀerent anticipations about the system evolution. Their individual preferences
are described by distinct output pathways:
η






T2 },i =1 ,2
These represent targets or goals that the players wish to achieve during the period of the
game. In the context of a partial cooperation, the players’ targets are closed, while for a full
cooperation, these are supposed to be identical.
3In order to ensure the system stability during the entire planning process, the players are
supposed to choose small values for their individual targets:
0 <y
g(i)
t ≤ lt < 1,t =1 ,...,T2
where lt are common optimal bounds selected according to foreseeable movements in y.
For simplicity, one can suppose that lt = l ∈ (0,1) for all t =1 ,...,T2. Smaller targets
generally require a higher risk-aversion, as well as a higher eﬀort to be invested.
Large deviations of the system from the ﬁxed targets signify that k yt − y
g(i)
t k > 1f o r
t =1 ,...,T2. These are probably due to the measurement errors, and may be always negotiated
ex-post. For this study, it is assumed that the players’ targets remain unchanged for the sample
observations.














t and α ∈ (0,1), the diﬃc u l t yt oo v e r c o m ei st oc h o i c et h eo p t i m a lv a l u eo ft h e
parameter α that satisﬁes the individual preferences of the players.
Remark 2. Arrive to an agreement generally implies a tˆ atonnement process from the part
of the players. The stage which will put the bases of the agreement will be crucial. Even
if the game starts in a non-cooperative manner, a potential cooperation can occur in every
stage of the game, or the players can have the intention to play cooperatively in the future.
Promises about future behavior can inﬂuence the players’ current behavior. Note here that the
agreements to play a Nash equilibrium are fragile when players have a strict preference over
their opponent’s strategy choice (Aumann 1990).
Assumption 3. The timing of the game is as follows: At each period t,t h ep l a y e r s
implement their actions x
(i)
t (i =1 ,2), which are a stimulus for the system. A shock ut is
realized and they observe the output (or impulse response) yt. A signal about the future trend
of the system is thus extracted. The uncertainty is reduced only ex-post, that is, only after the
informative output message has been received. This output together with the corresponding
actions provide information on the data generating process. The players employ this output-
signal for a strategic learning (speciﬁc to a closed-loop monitoring) in order to drive the system
as close as possible to their desired path η(i).
Assumption 4. The optimality of the instrument x
(i)
t is considered with respect to a local
criterion W
(i)




the instrument deviation from the current position to the desired goal state, denoted by M(i)
xt
not. = xt − x
g(i)
t .
The player i’s instrument target x
g(i)
t desired to be achieved at time t is not necessarily equal
with the equilibrium target realized in t. It may be possible that diﬀerences between ex-ante
decisions and ex-post results exist.
Following Pindyck (1976), we choose a quadratic asymmetric performance criterion de-
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where W
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g(i)
t )0Kt,i(yt − y
g(i)
t )+2 ( yt − y
g(i)




































t )0qijt,i , j=1 ,2; i 6= j
with a prime denoting transpose.
The parameters Qiit, qiit, and respectively Qijt, qijt, show the importance attributed to the
realization of the targets x
g(i)
t , and respectively x
g(j)
t (t =1 ,...,T 2) .I no t h e rw o r d s ,i ti st a k e n
into account the importance given to the reduction of the diﬀerence between the instruments
and their corresponding target values. The desired values of the instruments are included in
the quadratic loss function to prevent them from going too far away from realistic values.
The corresponding weighting parameters are related to the relative loss attributed to the non-
achievement of the target values for the instruments.
The asymmetry of the criterion derives, on the one hand, from the diﬀerence in penalty
costs that the players may attach to errors (depending on whether these are errors of over-
shooting or errors of shortfall about the targets) and, on the other hand, due to the additional
terms, dependent on the instruments, introduced in the expression of the quadratic performance
function.




t (t =1 ,...,T 2; i =1 ,2)
is not symmetric. In other words, the players are not indiﬀerent as regards the sign of the
deviations M(i) Y
not. =( M(i) y1,...,M(i) yT2) and, respectively, M(i) X
not. =( M(i) x1,...,M(i) xT2).
The decision for choosing certain parameters Kt,i and dt,i reﬂects the priorities of the player
i and also depends on the available amount of information concerning the future development
of the system parameters. It allows to weight diﬀerently the various loss components. At
each period t, the parameters Kt,i and dt,i are updated and new optimal values are chosen in
order to satisfy the player i’s requirements. The players choose the parameters which yield less
ﬂuctuating controls.
In this formulation of the model, we deal with a reference-dependent behavior of the players.
Experimental evidence in a variety of economic environments show that the behavior of decision-
makers depends on strategic reference points.






T2)c o n -
ditional to the policy rule of his opponent. In both cooperative and non-cooperative world,
the players adjust their instrument settings period by period to accommodate past information
errors and revised projections for the remaining planning periods.
This is the classical context, often employed in the literature, where the hypothesis of risk-
neutrality for both players is adopted for the entire period of the game.
3. Endogenous Risk-Aversion
Attitudes to risk may diﬀer across players. There is by now accumulating evidence that
players diﬀer substantially in their risk-preferences. They generally have diﬀerent degrees of
uncertainty to achieve the desired outputs.





k yt−1 − y
g(i)




(k yt−1 − y
g(i)
t−1 k2 +... + k yt−ki − y
g(i)
t−ki k2)2 + li
,t =1 ,...,T2
5where:
• −1 < Lt−1,i < Lt−2,i <. . .<Lt−ki,i < 0 are strategic weights attached to the system





• li ≥ 1i saﬁxed integer which characterizes the player i’s type (more or less risk-averse).
• 1 ≤ ki <T 2 is an optimal number of periods (the most informative) for the player i.




1−ki,...} the history of the process and, respectively,
the targets of the player i during the ﬁrst playing period [−T1,0]. The set of parameters
{L0,i,...,L1−ki,i,...} represents strategic weights attached to the system deviations with respect
to the player i’s optimal path for the period [−T1,0].
One can imagine several scenarios when comparing the degree of risk-aversion exhibited by
the players: i) when both players have similar coeﬃcients of risk-aversion during the period




t | is small, with t ∈ {1,...,T2}) ;i i )w h e nb o t hp l a y e r sh a v et h e




t ,w i t ht ∈ {1,...,T2}
taking ﬁxed values); and iii) when players have very diﬀerent degrees of risk-aversion during




t | is high, with t ∈ {1,...,T2}).
Let ϕ
(i)
min be a risk-aversion threshold ﬁxed by the player i before starting the control and for
the entire period [1,T 2]. When this limit threshold is exceeded, the player i becomes excessively
risk-averse for the current control period, being characterized by an extreme pessimism.




min (i =1 ,2). In other words, it must
distinguish between local risk-aversion (at time t) and global risk-aversion (over the entire
period [1,T 2]).
It is thus possible to diﬀe r e n t i a t et h et y p e so fc o m m o n/ d i s t i n c tp l a y e r sa sf o l l o w s :
−1 <ϕ
(i)










min, less < 0 (less risk-averse player)
with 1 ≤ li,more < li,less two strategic parameters which characterize the risk-averse type of the
player i. For further details, see Protopopescu (2007).
The number of players in the game can modify their individual attitude towards risk but
not their types.
4. Endogenous Eﬀort Behavior
It is well-known that the uncertainty diminishes with time and eﬀort. If the players are
supposed to be risk-averse, there is no obvious reason why they should also be assumed to be
eﬀort-averse. We could measure the eﬀort-aversion just as the risk-aversion is measured. In
general, the players diﬀer in their eﬀort-preferences.
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,t =1 ,...,T 2
6where si ∈ (0,1] and di ∈ (1,2] are two strategic parameters which characterize the player
i’s type (more or less eﬀort-averse).
Each player gives a greater importance to the system deviation which is closer to the moment
of implementation of a new optimal action. The optimal eﬀort level at each stage of the game
is dictated by the system evolution and the players’ eﬀort behavior proﬁles. It does not always
take a minimum value, as the intuition would suggest. The system will not incite equally the
players to invest eﬀort.
There exist situations where the players are interested in increasing the eﬀort by enforcing
the active learning in order to improve their objectives. Further eﬀort is necessary if the risk
is to be reduced or avoided in the future. In a ﬂuctuating system, increasing the eﬀort is not
always suﬃcient to avoid a high risk. It may be the case of a system with a high inertia.
Increases in the eﬀort cost (measured in terms of disutility) result in reduced eﬀort levels. This
is a direct consequemce of the importance the players place on the system deviations with
respect to their ﬁxed targets.
Optimal eﬀort-sharing generally depends on the players’ ﬁxed objectives. The closer their
objectives, the closer their attitudes to eﬀort over time. The equilibrium and stability of the
dynamic system is dependent on the cumulative eﬀorts of the players.
It is easy to see that e
(i)
t is a non-monotonous function of t. There exist periods where the
players need to allocate a higher eﬀort with respect to others. The eﬀort invested by the players
is no more seen as a pure disutility, like in the traditional approach, but rather as an eﬃcient
instrument in optimizing the equilibrium solution.
One can imagine several scenarios when comparing the eﬀort exhibited by the players: i)










t ,w i t ht ∈ {1,...,T2} taking ﬁxed values); and iii) when players exert very




t | is high, with t ∈ {1,...,T 2}).
The players’ utilities for the period t are assumed to be multiplicative separable in the eﬀort
level e
(i)


























t ) − 1],i =1 ,2; t =1 ,...,T2




t ) > 0,D
(i)0(e
(i)
t ) > 0,D
(i)00(e
(i)
t ) > 0, ∀ e
(i)
t ∈ [0,1), ∀ t =1 ,...,T2
Dynamic games in which each player has an exponential utility function are referred to as
risk-sensitive dynamic games. Due to the imperfect information about the system reaction,
it is perfectly reasonable to consider a maximization on a short-time horizon for the players’
utility functions. The expected utility level attained by a player may be measured exactly by
his opponent only under idealized conditions.
Ah i g h e re ﬀort does not necessarily ensure a lower utility level. It is also important to
note that a risk-averse player does not necessarily invest a higher eﬀort level compared to a










Suppose that the player i will ﬁx before starting the game an optimal eﬀort-aversion thresh-
old e
(i)
max which must not be exceeded during the entire control period. If it happens, he becomes
excessively eﬀort-averse for the current period of the game.
7The eﬀort thresholds e
(i)
max (i =1 ,2) are chosen such that these characterize the best the




max. In other words, it must
distinguish between local eﬀo r tl e v e l( a tt i m et) and global eﬀort-aversion (over the entire period
[1,T 2]).















Note that an exceeding of the risk-aversion threshold ϕ
(i)
min does not necessarily imply an
exceeding of the eﬀort-aversion threshold e
(i)
max. If the player i is less (more) risk-averse by
nature, then he will choose a higher (smaller) eﬀort-aversion threshold e
(i)
max. There is thus a
trade-oﬀ between less risk-aversion and higher eﬀort investment.

































In the case where the player i is characterized by a high risk-aversion in t−1 and the system
deviation k yt−1−y
g(i)





min but the value of k yt−1 −y
g(i)
t−1 k is small, then the player i is not incited to










t. Moreover, an exceeding of the threshold e
(i)
max for the player i does not necessarily induce an
exceeding of the threshold e
(j)
max for his opponent. In other words, the players do not necessarily



































We can thus distinguish between two disutility thresholds according to the player i’s indi-








max, less); and ii)









During the entire game period, the player i has three strategic objectives: i) to optimally
track the targets y
g(i)
t ; ii) not to exceed the risk-aversion threshold ϕ
(i)
min; and iii) not to exceed
the eﬀort-aversion threshold e
(i)
max.
The relationship between the players’ reaction to the perceived states of nature and their
attitude to eﬀort is complex. In general, eﬀort aversion makes the reaction stronger than eﬀort
neutrality.
In the case of a cooperative game with common ﬁxed objectives, the evolution of the system
generates close attitudes to eﬀort for the players. It is also useful to note that the length of
8the game has a non-negligible eﬀect on the players’ eﬀort behavior. The shorter the planning
horizon, the higher the players’ eﬀort-aversion before starting the game. A closed-loop Nash
game is therefore correlated with smaller eﬀort-thresholds ﬁxed by the players. For further
details, see Protopopescu (2008).
Note that the equilibrium of the game is not necessarily realized with minimum-eﬀort co-
ordination, as other authors have assumed in related issues (Anderson et al. 1996, 2001).
5. Game’s Information Structure
Most commonly studied asymmetric Nash games in the literature are games where there
are not identical strategy sets for the players. However, it is possible for a Nash game to have
identical strategies for all players, yet be asymmetric.
The player i’s behavior at time t is characterized by a strategy s
(i)
t : I(i) → Rqi which pre-
scribes, according to the information set I(i), an action /distribution over the feasible strategy
set S(i). This determines the ability of the player i to aﬀect the set of feasible strategies of his
opponent.
The player i’s information set I(i) can contain: i) the system parameters of interest; ii) an
a priori distribution on the initial state of the system; iii) the distribution of the input errors;
iv) his ﬁxed output targets; v) his desired instruments targets; vi) his local utility /loss levels
(and maybe of his opponent); vii) his individual risk distribution; viii) his individual eﬀort
distribution; and ix) his individual strategy (and maybe of his opponent).
The player i’s information set at time t is given by the whole observable history up to that
period. This is endogenously determined by the equilibrium behavior itself. More exactly, the
information set is reached along the equilibrium path of the dynamic system. In equilibrium,




I(i) be the common knowledge of the game. It transmits information about
how the game has been played up to each information set I(i). Even if the players have access to
the same information, the losses caused by information errors (although errors common to both
players) can easily be larger for non-cooperative rather than for cooperative solutions because
under cooperation the risks are eﬀectively spread over the players.
The players receive imperfect information about the system and this information is not
shared. They adjust their individual actions until their decisions are mutually consistent. The
player i is not generally informed about all the knowledge of his opponent even if the private
information is of common interest. If the players diﬀer in their degree of information accurracy,
then the equilibrium of the game can be seen as non-symmetrical.
Note that in most games, common knowledge of the structure of the game and of players’
rationality are not suﬃcient to predict that an equilibrium will be played, even if it is the unique
equilibrium of the game. Nash equilibrium concept requires not only common knowledge of
rationality, and of the game, but also that each player has the right expectations about what
his opponent is going to play (especially when there are multiple equilibria).
When both players are rational and their rationality is common knowledge, then the
resulting outcome will be rationalizable (Bernheim 1984; Pearce 1984).
6. Strategies for a Nash Equilibrium
In this section, closed-loop Nash equilibrium solutions sensitive to endogenous risk and
9eﬀort are derived for a discrete time linear-quadratic game under partial information sharing
environment. One deals with a strategic equilibr i u mi nw h i c he a c hp l a y e rt a k e st h er e a c t i o n s
of his opponent at least partially into account.
From the game theory point of view, the equilibrium is interpreted as a state from which no
player, given the rules, has any incentive to deviate. In other words, the players cannot beneﬁt
from deviating from their announced strategy. Therefore, we are looking for combinations of
strategies which are such that if one player deviates from his strategy, this one will only lose.
If a player deviates from the equilibrium control rule, the state vector will be driven to a
diﬀerent position. The deviators will be observed only ex-post, as it is most often the case in
practice.
Each player learns about his opponent’s strategies by observing the actions that have been
played. This information is employed to anticipate the behavior of his opponent. New infor-
mation resolves uncertainty step by step.
The Nash equilibrium concept reduces the set of all possible choices of the players to a much
smaller set of those choices that are stable in the sense that no player can improve his payoﬀ by
deviating unilaterally (i.e., changing his strategy while the opponent player holds his strategy
ﬁxed). Each player is assumed to know the equilibrium strategy of his opponent, not being
aﬀected by his own strategy. The strategic interactions are only possible in the space which
determines the set of feasible equilibria.
Let Et−1(·)
def. = E(·|It−1) be the operator of conditional expectation, where It−1 is the
information available up to time t − 1. In what follows, denote by s
(−i)
t the strategy of the
opponent player at time t. For the present study, we consider the case of a closed-loop (state-
dependent) control, when It ∈ Ct for t =1 ,...,T2. A feedback revision process is thus required.




t ) and the corresponding payoﬀsc o n s t i t u t et h e
Nash equilibrium of the game at period t if each player’s strategy yields the player at least as





















The player i chooses the strategy s
o(i)
t in order to force the opponent player to play s
o(−i)
t ,
so as to secure himself an expected quantity. He could gain more by not playing s
o(i)
t if the
expectation that his opponent cooperates were fulﬁlled, but he could lose more if it were not.
It is precisely in this sense that one can say that a Nash solution is generally risk-averse.
The concept of Nash equilibrium embodies a notion of individual rationality, since each
player’s equilibrium strategy is the best reply to the opponent’s strategy. Unfortunately, this
does not specify how each player can arrive to form beliefs about his opponent’s strategies that
support equilibrium play.
The closed-loop Nash equilibrium is the result of learning from past experience. The ﬁrst-
period actions will alter the next-period decisions. In other words, dynamically strategic players
anticipate the outcome of the continuation of the game in making their period-one actions. The
strategy of each player is thus justiﬁable, in the sense that it is optimal, given the anticipation
of each player over the possible strategy of his opponent. This dynamic-strategic eﬀect will be
integrated in the computation of the closed-loop equilibrium.
In most practical economic applications, besides the model equation constraint for each
policy period, additional dynamic constraints for smoothing and bounding the controls may



























the feasible strategies space for the player i at time t.
The ﬁrst set of constraints is imposed in order to keep the instruments within speciﬁc
bounds. The wider the bound on the instruments, the higher the importance given by the
players to the variation of the instruments in that direction, so that they ﬁtt ot h ea c t i v e
learning process. It is assumed that each player chooses these bounds at each iteration of their
control algorithm. In this way, they can exploit the information on the previous instruments
when ﬁxing the bounds for the next instruments by allowing a greater variability for an eﬃcient
instrument rather than for an ineﬃcient one.
The bounds on the instruments are simply the limits up to which the players decide to extend
the research of the optimal solution at each iteration. As regards the last set of constraints,
this indicates that the variation of control variables between two consecutive periods lies within
prespeciﬁed bounded intervals. The values of this variation can be either positive or negative.
The two sets of constraints are called boundary conditions. These restrict the set of potential
Nash equilibria. In a full cooperative game, the players are supposed to choose the same
amplitude /change bounds for their individual controls.
We are now in a position to derive the closed-loop Nash equilibrium sensitive to endogenous
risk-and eﬀort-aversion of the players.
Proposition 1: Suppose that the matrices Mt,i(ϕ
(i)
t )










t + Qiit,w i t he Ht,i






t )Ht,i, are inversible for
each t =1 ,...,T2 and i =1 ,2. Under the hypotheses stated in Section 2, the Nash equilibrium





t yt−1 + g
(i)
t ,t =1 ,...,T2; i =1 ,2


















































and −1 power denoting inverse.
Proof. The dynamic programming problem is made in discrete time and uncertain future.




T2 (forward through time).
We maximize period by period, working every time conditionally to the information acquired.
At each period t, the player i will solve the following stochastic optimization programme:
s
o(i)
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g(i)
t ,H t,i
def. = Kt,i,h t,i
not. = Kt,iy
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t − dt,i,f t,i
not. = y
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t Ht,i)(e ut − ut) + (independent of e ut)2
12It follows that:















































































Thus, the integral becomes:
e I
(i)

























t Ht,i)(e ut − ut))de ut
The last integral is equal to 1 because the integrand is the probability density function of a
p-dimensional normal random variable:





with −1 power denoting inverse.
If we replace ut by its value, we ﬁnd without diﬃculty:
e I
(i)





where Ip is a p × p indentity matrix.
By consequence, we have:
V
(i)
t =e x pω1(it) ·e I
(i)
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not. = Ψ−1 + ϕ
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It is important to note that the strategies adopted depend on the players’ types or char-
acteristics. Accurate estimates are necessary for an eﬃcient implementation of the players’
strategies. These represent a basic information for the optimal decision making process. Policy
changes (or other exogenous changes) will cause changes in the players’ decision rules, and
thus in their behavioral relationships. This reveals the role played by the information structure
in the measurements of the Nash equilibrium. In the case where the policy instruments em-
ployed by the players require information on all states of the system, the policy rule becomes
complicated from the viewpoint of implementation and computing cost.
As opposed to the Stackelberg equilibrium, the Nash equilibrium is not necessarily deﬁned
uniquely (Nash 1950, 1951). Several equilibria may co-exist. In this case, the players are
expected to choose the equilibrium which leads to the lowest output level ensuring the system
stability. Dynamical systems with several equilibria occur in various ﬁelds of economics. It
may be the case of a non-cooperative Nash game. The outcome of the game may thus be
diﬃcult to predict. It may also exist situations when computing a Nash equilibrium is an
intractable problem. A possibility to overcome this limitation is to compute approximate
Nash equilibria using randomized algorithms. It is useful to note that Nash equilibrium and
Stackelberg equilibrium may give very diﬀerent outcomes.
Diﬀerent contexts of decision making generally call for diﬀerent strategies. When the number
of players in the game is large, the equilibrium is generally of non-cooperative type, whereas
when the number of players is small, the outcome may be cooperative.
Because the source of randomness may diﬀer from an application to another, the players’
strategies may vary. It is of great interest to know whether small changes in the problem
14statement will cause signiﬁcative changes in the solution equilibrium. It comes to analyze the
sensitivity of the results to the choice of policy instruments and rules employed by the players.
The present approach improves the traditional solution concept of Nash strategy with
closed-loop information structure for discrete-time linear-quadratic games, by considering the
case when the players exhibit endogenous risk-and eﬀort (Papavassilopoulos 1981; Cara-
vani and Papavassilopoulos 1990; Krajewski 1991; Basar 1999; Klompstra 2000;
Krawczyk 2000; Krawczyk and Tidball 2006; Jimenez-Lizarraga et al. 2009).
7. Concluding Remarks
The present approach extends the solution concept of Nash equilibrium to strategic dy-
namic games with asymmetric players characterized by endogenous preferences over risk and
eﬀort. A complete analytical description of discrete-time closed-loop Nash strategies sensitive
to endogenous risk and eﬀort is provided. The borderline case of excessive risk /eﬀort-averse
players is considered in the analysis. It reveals important aspects about the close relationship
that exists between excessive risk /eﬀort-averse behavior and deviating equilibrium strategy.
A cooperative game is generally correlated with an optimal risk-and eﬀort-sharing between the
players.
The analysis can be easily extended to a dynamic coalition game model with cooperative
and non-cooperative elements. It is the case where a group of players decide to act together, as
one unit, relative to the rest of the players, each group being characterized by a joint strategy.
One can suppose that players organize themselves in coalitions which form a partition, that
is, each player belongs to one and only one coalition. When players form conjectures, they
expect to obtain better results than in the individual case. Forming a coalition, this does not
eliminate the individual players as decision-makers. In all interactions with the other players,
each coalition is represented by an exponent of its members. This arrangement will continue
only as long as each player ﬁnds it desirable to act in this way. All the coalitions are then
examinated by each player, the rationality of the game being to choose or not one particular
coalition, given the obtained results. Each coalition will play a game of common interests, that
is, one with a strongly Pareto dominant payoﬀ vector. However, each player may control his
level of cooperation. Therefore, it is possible to exist another contract between the players
within each coalition. Most of the existing models in game theory assume that the coalition
structure is given exogenously. More realistic, it can be given as an endogenous outcome,
being possible to predict which coalitions will form in each given situation. The players’ eﬀort
behavior proﬁles will determine the structure of strategic coalitions. New information in the
game aﬀects the players’ eﬀort preferences in the coalition formation process.
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